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ROSCOE POUND*
LINUS J. MCMANAMAN,
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A

MONG AMERICAN jurists, as well as among those of the
rest of the world, there is a noticeable interest in natural law.
Many are calling for some ultimate principles of law to halt the onward
march of pragmatism and its natural offspring, legal realism. But,
unhappily, they are not looking for a natural law in the traditional
Thomistic sense, a natural law that is binding even in the absence
of all positive disposition. Rather they are seeking an ideal picture
of law to serve as a norm for the elaboration of positive law.
Roscoe Pound is an example of those who see philosophy and
natural law only as something to fill lacunae in the positive law,
or to serve as post factum critique of the established law. 'The
traditional meaning of natural law has been lost, and scholastic
philosophers are not without fault. Too often natural law has been
rejected by jurists outside of Thomistic schools because it has not
been properly presented. There is a task for scholastics of guarding
against being deserving of the criticism directed at the contemporary
received natural law, and of entering into the arena with our contemporaries to confront them with the true natural-law tradition.
It is beyond the scope of this article to present a complete survey
of Thomistic natural law. But in reviewing the legal theory of Roscoe
Pound we may see where scholasticism may become an effective force.
Pound and his Problems
It was August 29, 1906, at the Capitol Building, St. Paul,
Minnesota, the twenty-ninth Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association.
A young, hitherto unheralded, jurist and professor
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from the University of Nebraska shocked
the assembled jurists into attention and
divided the group into two camps with a
paper entitled, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction With the Administration
of Justice.' It was in this way that
Roscoe Pound launched the most brilliant
career in American jurisprudence, or perhaps, in all contemporary jurisprudence.
In the assembly at this meeting there
was on the one side the "old guard" who
felt that there was no popular dissatisfaction, or, granting that there may have
been a little, they claimed that it was
without reason. On the other side was
the avant garde who lined up with Pound
in a demand for better laws, for better
and more effective administration of justice. It is not without significance that
his first address of national importance
was concerned with imperfections in the
administration of justice. The task which
he undertook, and which he continues
with undiminished vigor, is that of improving the administration of justice. It
is a task in which, happily for us, he has
met with a considerable amount of success.
The St. Paul address may have earned
him a number of opponents as well as
friends, but it also won him national
recognition and an invitation to move
from the relative obscurity of the
Nebraska school to the more known and
more influential Northwestern University
Law School in Evanston, Illinois. While
there, he was instrumental in organizing
'The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With
the Administration of Justice, Address before
A.B.A. Annual Meeting (1906), reprinted in
20 J. AM. JUD. SoC'Y (1937).

the National Conference on Criminal Law
and Criminology and the Illinois Law
Review, of which he was editor-in-chief.
In 1909 he was appointed to the law
faculty of the University of Chicago. He
next became Carter Professor of Law at
Harvard Law School, and in 1916 was
elected dean of that school, a position he
held until his resignation in 1936. As
dean for twenty years of what is usually
considered the nation's most influential
law school he was in a position to exercise an enormous impact upon the legal
profession. This influence was widened
in centrifugal circles as more than a
generation of students trained under him
entered the legal profession, many of
them as professors in other schools of
law.
Upon his resignation from the
deanship of Harvard he continued an
active life as author, lecturer and teacher,
and performed such functions as serving
on a commission for the codification of
Chinese law. More recently he spent two
years in California organizing a new law
school at the University of California,
Los Angeles, before returning in the fall
of 1952 to Harvard.
The importance and influence of Pound
can hardly be called into question, but
rather than assume it to be known we
can cite a few of the many tributes to his
erudition. Professor Thomas A. Cowan
of Nebraska University credits him with
reworking the whole structure of American legal thought.2 Professor Paul Sayre
of New York University notes that all the

2Cowan, A Report on the Status of Philosophy of Law in the United States, 50 COLUM.
L. REV. 1092 (1950).
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rest of the legal scholars have lived off
Pound's erudition for more than forty
years. 3 Professor Edwin W. Patterson
finds Pound's influence in jurisprudence
an aid in preparing legislation, in predicting legal trends and in interpreting legal
literature.
He continues that Pound's
ideas have become commonplace, a fact
4
that is a tribute to his insight and vision.
Dean Emeritus Albert Kocourek of
Northwestern compares him to an Alpine
peak towering above all the surrounding
landscape.5 And, finally, Professor Herbert D. Laube of Cornell finds that the
genius of Pound is as penetrating as John
Austin's, as illuminating as Henry Maine's,
as resourceful as Rodolf von Ihering's
and as humanizing as Lester F. Ward's;
his influence is more widespread than
that of any jurist ever honored by the
Roman Empire.6 The tribute paid to him
on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday in 1947 is indicative of his international as well as his American reputa7
tion.

Turning now from this brief biographical note 8 we take up the reasons he saw
for the "popular dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice" in order better
to understand what he hoped to accomplish. But to understand the problems
as he saw them and the solutions he
offers we must review, however briefly,
the legal and intellectual milieu into
which he entered at the turn of the century. The principles of natural law which
served as the foundation of American
law in its inception, as stated in the

3 POUND,

and South America, South Africa, Australia
and Europe.
The Introduction contains many congratulatory
messages from many foreign jurists, legal associations and politicians. Edmond N. Cahn finds
the fact that only two of the thirty-eight essays
deal directly with Pound, a tribute to the
fact that he created a widespread and informed
interest in legal philosophy where he had found
a generation composed almost entirely of ignoramuses and misologists. Cahn, Jurisprudence,
ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 1099, 1104 (1947).
8 For a bibliography of works about Pound
published before July 1, 1940, see SETARO, A
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57 HARV. L. REV. 581, 584-85 (1944).
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Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies:
Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound contains
essays by thirty-eight legal scholars from North

7

Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution, and which continued as the
dominant force in the formative era of
American law from the Revolution to the
Civil War, began to decline in importance about the middle of the last century.
By the end of the century its importance
was negligible. 9
Beginning with the second half of the
last century the historical school of legal
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interpretation was in the ascendancy.
Many factors combined to explain this
phenomenon, not the least of which was
the fact that, in 1849, Luther S. Cushing, a student of Savigny, was teaching
law at Harvard University. This fact in
addition to the appearance a few years
earlier of the writings of Kent (1826-30)
and Story (1832-45) led to widespread
acceptance of historical jurisprudence.' 0
The movement received new impetus
when, after 1870, American legal students in increasing numbers were pursuing their studies in Germany. Stated
briefly this school maintains, after Savigny, that law cannot be made but must
be found, the growth of law being an
unconscious, organic process with legislation subordinated to custom. As law
grows and becomes more complex and
the popular consciousness (Volksgeist)
cannot manifest itself directly, it becomes
represented by lawyers who formulate
the technical legal principles; the lawyers
do not form laws but formulate the popular consciousness; legislation follows as
the last stage. Laws are not universally
valid or applicable, but each people has
its own legal habits just as it has a
peculiar language which is not applicable
to others. In this system the jurist ranks
before the legislator in legal progress;
but the jurist does not make laws, rather
he develops the technique of following
the evolution of the Volksgeist by legal

10

Id. at 21:

"With

the rise

of historical

thinking in the nineteenth century there comes
to be a combination of history and philosophy,
observable in Kent and marked in Story. The
stabilizing work of natural law is taken over
by history. .....

historical
research.11
The historical
school has always been skeptical of legislation and opposed to codification.
Competing with the historical school
for the primacy was another group which
Pound calls the school of "philosophical
jurisprudence." 12 This is a heterogeneous group comprising many philosophies
and various versions of natural-law jurisprudence. For the most part they had
degenerated into a legal formalism, holding that a perfect legal system could be
deduced from an ideal of the nature of
law by a process of formal logic, valid
for all peoples, at all times and in every
place. This theory represents the remains of the so-called "classical natural
law" of the eighteenth century which had
already been rejected on the Continent
and was rapidly losing favor in America.
Like proponents of historical jurisprudence, though for different reasons, they
maintained that law could not be made
but could only be found, the method of
finding it being different. Also like the
historical school, they doubted the possibility of creative legislation.
A third school which gained accept"FRIEDMANN,

LEGAL

THEORY

129

(2d ed.

1949). Friedmann cites the Hayward English
translation of Savigny as follows: ". . . the
sum therefore of this theory is that all law is
originally formed in the manner in which in
ordinary, but not quite correct language, customary law is said to have been formed, i.e.,
that it is first developed by custom and popular
faith, next by jurisprudence, everywhere therefore by internal silently operating powers, not
by the arbitrary will of a law giver."
Cf.
POUND, op. cit. supra note 9, at 115 (1938); 8
ENCYC. Soc.

Sci. 477-92 (1932).

ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 482 (1932); cf. PoUND,
op. cit. supra note 9; POUND, THE SPIRIT OF
THE COMMON LAW 151 (1921).
128

13
ance among many jurists was analytical
jurisprudence, of which Bentham was the
founder. Like Austin's mechanical jurisprudence, the analytical school considered positive law to be self-sufficient,
divorced from any concept of natural law,
ethics, or the other social sciences. Traditionally the analytical school has had
unlimited confidence in man's ability to
legislate, and its advocates have always
favored codification. However, in the
last third of nineteenth century America,
Bentham's followers began to doubt that
we could add to or produce human happiness by legislation. Consequently, they
developed what Pound calls a "juristic
pessimism" substantially the same as the

historical and philosophical schools. It is
a curious phenomenon that the different
schools by different paths, arrived at the
common conclusion that constructive leg3
islation was impossible?
Just before the turn of the century,
when Pound came to the bar, pragmatism
was coming into its own as the dominant
American
philosophy.
Initiated
by
Charles Peirce, developed and popularized by William James, and brought to
13 POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW
151 (1921).
"Five types of philosophy of law
in the nineteenth century are of significance
for our present purpose. We may call those
who adhered to them the metaphysical school,
the historical school, the utilitarians, the
positivists and the mechanical sociologists. It
is a striking example of the way in which the
same conclusion may sustain the most divergent
philosophical premises that all of these arrived
ultimately at the same juristic position by
wholly diverse routes and from the most diverse
starting points, so that the futility of conscious
effort to improve the condition of humanity
through the law and the conception of justice
as the securing of the maxims of self-assertion
become axioms of juristic thought." Id. at 151.
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completion by John Dewey, pragmatism
has dominated the philosophical field for
more than half a century. Dean Pound
has frequently pointed out that legal
theory is very resistant to change and
usually lags a generation behind changes
in philosophical ideals. This was also
true of pragmatism, which had not seriously affected juristic thinking at the turn
of the century. However, with the eloquent influence of Oliver W. Holmes,
pragmatism soon became the dominant
legal philosophy. More recently pragmatism has divided into many, and often
contradictory, branches. The most vocal
contemporary group is the school of legal
realism, a name which Pound characterizes as a boast rather than a description.14 This group did not merit serious
consideration when Pound first began his
career, but they are introduced here because much of his subsequent writing is
concerned with them. The realists deny
the efficacy not only of natural law and
positive law, but further they repudiate
the principle of judicial precedent, which
is the very cornerstone of the commonlaw system.15 For them there is no law
except the judge's decision in the individdual case, and that decision is law for
that case alone, not being drawn from
previous cases and not affecting future
cases.

14

POUND,

JUSTICE

ACCORDING

TO

LAW

63

(1951); cf. Pound, The Call For a Realistic
Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. REV. 697 (1931).
15

GARLAN, LEGAL REALISM AND JUSTICE

20-21,

24, 42 (1941).
"A right-is an affair of the
future, and for the individual who claims the
right it is an affair of probability." Id. at 93.
Cf. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
(1930).
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In the light of this review, however
brief, of his intellectual environment we
can now pose the problems which Pound
saw and to the correction of which he
set his mind and his pen. Some of
these problems are not original with
Pound or peculiar to America, but as
ancient as law itself. Others, however,
are a peculiar product of the time and
place.
The first problem, which he calls the
"perennial problem" of law because it
goes back to the very beginnings of law,
has two aspects, but because of their
close association they can be, and are,
treated as one. These two aspects are,
first, the general security versus the individual life, and secondly, the need for
stability versus the need for change. Different legal theories at different times
have maintained one of these at the expense of the other. Pound feels that these
preferences cannot be maintained. In
America, during the last century, the general security was preferred. In the present century, there is a tendency to prefer
The problem is to
the individual life.'
have a legal system which gives recognition to one without destroying the other.
The formalists and analytical school protected the general security by providing
in advance for every eventuality, but they
gave no consideration to the individual
offender; the law had to be applied me10

POUND,

AN

INTRODUCTION

TO THE

PHILOS-

"The last century
OF LAW 96 (1922).
The present
preferred the general security.
century has shown many signs of preferring
the individual moral and social life. I doubt
whether such preferences can maintain themselves." Ibid. Cf. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
OPHY

IN AMERICA

38 (1930).

chanically.
Contrariwise the historical
school, and even more so the realists,
consider only the individual case, thereby
endangering the general security.
Considering the problem from the
viewpoint of stability versus change, the
alignment is almost the same. For the
formalists and analytical jurists the perfect code is valid for all times. For the
historians and realists there is only
change.' 7 Stability is required so that
men may plan a course of action with a
reasonable expectancy of what course the
law will take. It is particularly true in
economic fields that men wish to act with
confidence that their operations of today
will not be judged illegal tomorrow. At
the same time the law may not be so
rigorous as not to accommodate itself to
the changes in society which are constantly taking place.
There were other problems, more peculiar to the time and place, in Pound's
mind, not only in his famous St. Paul
address, but in much of his subsequent
speaking and writing. The first of these,
already intimated, was what he calls
The various
"juristic pessimism." 18
schools of jurisprudence, from diverse
premises, arrived at the common conclusion that legislation is impossible or useless. This give-it-up philosophy generated
the attitude that you cannot do anything,
therefore do not try to do anything.
Against this attitude Pound has been a
relentless foe.
Secondly, a major problem for American jurisprudence was created by the
17

Cf. FRANK, op. cit. supra note 15.
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON

18 Cf.
LAW

(1921).

13
enormous changes in the social and economic order. The law, as received into
America and developed during the formative era, was ideally adapted to a pioneer, agricultural society. But by the turn
of the century the era of expansion and
frontier was rapidly being passed and the
country was becoming an urban, industrial society. Changes in law had not
kept pace with the changes in the structure of society. 19
A third problem which he attacked was
the inadequate education of the legal profession. One could with reason cite
Pound's own biography as indicative of
the meager requirements for admission
to the bar. That he became the most
eminent among the legal scholars is a
tribute to his own initiative and genius
and not to the demands of the legal profession. That these demands were not
exacting can be seen from the fact that
he was admitted to the bar before reaching the age of twenty after having already
begun a career as a botanist. In the beginning of American legal history this
was not accidental but part of a policy.
An excessive fervor for democracy and
universal equality fostered the idea that
no professional class should be set apart;
every profession should be accessible to
all.20 He cites examples of blacksmiths,
farmers and common laborers who were
justices of state supreme courts . 1 The
19 POUND, THE FORMATIVE
LAW 98 (1938); POUND,
AND
THE
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practice of apprentice-training for lawyers
persisted well into the present century,
and almost anybody could serve a term
as a clerk in an attorney's office and then
go into practice for himself. 22 The situation reached such proportions as to
prompt Mr. Justice Miller to remark that
the prime factor in the formation of our
law was ignorance.23
A fourth problem is seen in the inadequate and poor legislation provided
by the lawmaking bodies of our government. Reasons for this legislative inadequacy are various, but certainly one reason was the traditional common-law
attitude toward legislation. The commonlaw jurist is wont to give very little recognition to legislative law, or, at best, to
interpret it very strictly as applying to
the particular case in point and not as
providing a point of departure for legal
reasoning. This attitude in turn led to
legislative irresponsibility, prompting legislators to give only skeleton rules or
directives, the details of which were to
be worked out by judicial decision; or
they turned out laws which were pracAnother reason
tically unenforceable.
can be found in a tendency of the legislative branch to meddle in judicial functions during the very early period of
legal history. The net result was a growing popular distrust of legislatures and a
turning to the judiciary not only for
judgment but also for making law. Judicial empiricism became the common man24
ner of lawmaking.
22POUND,

LAW 8 (1938).
21 Ibid.
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op. cit. supra note 20.
POUND, op. cit. supra note 20, at 39, 49, 59.

23 POUND,
24
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Related to this difficulty is a fifth problem of more recent origin. It is what
Pound calls administrative or executive
justice as contrasted with judicial justice.
In recent years, and particularly in the
last two decades, he sees a growing, and
undesirable, tendency for the executive
branch of the government to assume
many functions belonging properly to the
judiciary.25 This is seen as undesirable
because the executive branch is not ex
officio qualified by training and experience for the judicial functions. More important, he sees in administrative justice
26
a tendency towards absolutism.
Finally, a sixth problem requiring attention is the tendency, developed in the
last half of the last century, to mix law
and politics. Another name for the same
problem is the elective judiciary. 27 He
can see no correlation between a man's
qualifications to act as a judge and his
ability to influence voters to elect him to
the position of a judge. 28 The general
acceptance of the elected bench in state
and local jurisdictions has had an undesirable effect on the administration of
justice. 29 The desire to please the voter
or political patron whose support can insure the judge's position is too frequently
an impediment to justice.
Other problems could be considered,
JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 76-78,
(1951); cf. POUND, NEW PATHS OF THE
LAW ch. 3 (1950);
POUND, THE FORMATIVE
ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938).
20 POUND,
JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 76-78,
25 POUND,

and their omission is not to be considered
as granting them a slight importance.
The purpose here is to mention the main
problems which Pound attempted to solve
as a background against which to view
his theories on law. Further it is felt
that almost any other problem that might
be mentioned could be subsumed under
one of those already indicated. It should
not be expected that our author will single out each of these problems for individual treatment. Rather does he attempt a solution that will strike at the
roots of all of them simultaneously.
In studying his predecessors Pound saw
that all the nineteenth century schools
were subject to the common criticism of
attempting to construct a science of law
solely in terms of law and on the basis
of law, divorced from all other phenomena of social control and civilization. 0 For him a legal science, in order
to meet the needs of a changing society,
must give up its exclusiveness and work
in closer association with the other social
sciences.3' It must view law in all of its
senses in relation to the whole problem
of social control. 32 The social purposes
of law must be stressed more than the
sanctions, for law is to be regarded as a
social institution which can be improved
by intelligent effort. 3 3 To discover the
best means of directing and furthering
efforts to improve the law, the jurist must

83

83 (1951).
27 POUND,
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28 Ibid.
29 ibid.
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30 Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence (pt. 1),

51 HARV. L. REV. 444 (1938).
32 Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence (pt. 2),
52 HARV. L. REV. 777, 812 (1938).
32

Ibid.

3' Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pt. 3), 25 HARv. L. REV.
489 (1912).

13
be concerned with a wide range of
studies, and not just of law. This requires a study of the actual effects of
legal institutions and doctrines; a study
of the means of making legal rules effective; a sociological legal history, which is
a study not only of how doctrines have
evolved and developed, considered solely
as jural materials, but of what social effects the doctrines of law have produced
34
in the past and how they produce them.
The study of legal history is very important to see what effects the jurists desired
to produce, the effects actually produced
and the method used to produce the desired effect. The functional attitude,
which is the study not only of what legal
materials are and how they came to be,
but also of what they aim to effect and
how they work, is fundamental in Pound's
legal theory. Also, there must necessarily
be intensive study of philosophy and psychology; in order for a legal science to
be valuable it must be consistent with
the best of modem philosophy and psychology.3"
Pound pursued this course of studies
very seriously. He studied all the contemporary jurists, both of the English
common-law jurisdictions and the continental civil law systems, taking freely
from the most diverse schools of thought
the materials which he found useful; he
considered that there can be many approaches to juristic truth and that each
3.Pound, supra note 33, at 513-14; cf. POUND,
OUTLINES

OF

LECTURES

ON

JURISPRUDENCE

32-34 (5th ed. 1943).
3 Pound, A Call for a Realistic Jurisprudence,
44 HARv. L. REV. 697, 710-11 (1931); cf.
OUTLINES
POUND,
PRUDENCE 35 (5th
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can be significant to a particular problem. 36 Nor was legal history neglected;
he studied widely the legal systems of
the past. 37 In like manner he gave himself to the study of modem philosophy,
psychology and sociology. In sum, there
is scarcely anyone among modern and
contemporary sociologists, philosophers
and jurists to whom he does not owe,
and acknowledge, a debt. 8
It was in the light of these extensive
studies that Pound developed his system
of sociological jurisprudence. It presents
a curious union of many diverse, and
often contradictory, philosophies of law.
But to this peculiar union he does give a
fundamental unity based on the purpose
of law.
The Nature of Law
Before entering upon a detailed discussion of the nature of law according to
Pound, it is necessary first to have a clear
notion of our subject. It is to Pound's
credit that, among English-speaking jurists, he has done much in clarifying the
meaning, or diverse meanings, of "law."
Frequently among treatises on law we
find the term applied indiscriminately to
any one of a number of possibilities without distinction.
For Pound "law" has three meanings:
first, it signifies the legal order, i.e., the
supra
MPound,
6
37 POUND,

note 35, at 711.

INTERPRETATIONS

ON LEGAL HISTORY

(1923).
3sPound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence (pts.
1-2), 51-52 HARv. L. REV. 444, 777 (1938);
Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence (pt. 3), 25 HARv. L. REV. 489
(1912); cf. Thomas Cowan's article in INTERPRETATIONS

OF

MODERN

LEGAL

PHILOSOPHIES:

ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND
(Sayre ed. 1947).
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ordering of human conduct through the
systematic application of the force of
politically organized society. In this sense
it is called a regime of social control.
Secondly, it means the sum of the authoritative grounds for judicial and administrative decisions in such a society.
Thirdly, it may mean what is called the
"judicial process." A fourth meaning can
be added since the term "law" can be,
and often is, used to mean all three of
39
the other meanings just mentioned.
When we speak of a "science of law,"
we are using the term in the second
sense. It is in this sense that Dean Pound
uses the term in analyzing the science of
law,40 and it is likewise in this sense that
it will be used here unless otherwise indicated.
Used in this second sense as the body
of authoritative grounds for decisions,
law is not a simple concept. There are
contained within it three elements: precepts, technique, and ideals.4 1 Further3,Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Law, 47
HARV. L. REV. 1-2 (1933); cf. POUND, JUSTICE
ACCORDING
TO
LAW
48 (1951); Pound,
My Philosophy of Law, MY PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW,

CREDOS OF

SIXTEEN AMERICAN

SCHOLARS

(1941).
40 See
POUND, JUSTICE
ACCORDING
TO
LAW
49 (1951):
"The second sense is the one in
which Lawyers habitually use the term 'law.'
It is the meaning which the word has borne
since the classical Roman jurists and the one
to which we may well restrict it in the science
of Law." Ibid.
4) POUND, op. cit. supra note 40, at 50.
"[Alnalytical jurists had in mind the precept
element of law . . . historical jurists had in
mind very largely the [technique] traditional
art of the lawyer's craft . . . and philosophical
jurists had in mind the ideal element in law.
Today we may very well give up these discussions. All three elements should be considered and together they constitute the back-

more, the element of precepts contains
within itself four distinct concepts. First,
there is the rule or precept in the strict
sense, which determines a detailed set of
consequences for a determined state of
facts. Secondly, there are principles or
authoritative starting points for legal reasoning. Thirdly, there are legal conceptions or authoritative categories into
which cases are fitted, and by reason of
which certain rules and principles become
applicable, as, for example, sale and
trust. And, fourthly, there are standards42
or measures of conduct prescribed
by law from which one departs at his
own peril, as, for example, the standard
of due care not to cause an unreasonable
risk of injury to others.4
In speaking of law in this second sense
there is a temptation to think only of
precepts, and then only of the rules or
precepts in the strict sense. But in truth
the element of technique, or "art of the
lawyers' craft," and the element of ideals
are quite as authoritative and no less important. It is the element of technique
which distinguishes the two great modern
systems of the law.4 4 The technique of
the common-law lawyer consists in reasoning by analogy from reported judicial decisions while considering statutes as furnishing a rule for the class within its purground of juristic writing and judicial decision."
8 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 486 (1932).
4 POUND, op. cit. supra note 40, at 58. "There

is a characteristic element of fairness or reasonableness in standards which makes them a
point of contact between law and morals." Ibid.
43 Id. at 56-58.
See, e.g., POUND, SOURCES AND
FORMS OF LAW (1946); 8 ENCYC. SOC. SCI.
477-92 (1932).
44POUND,

op. cit. supra note 40, at 50-51;
POUND, THE TASK OF LAW 47-48 (1944).
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view and not as a starting point for legal
reasoning. The civil law, on the contrary,
reasons by analogy from legislative precepts while considering court decisions as
establishing only one precise point for
the case in litigation and not as a point
of departure for legal reasoning.
Like technique, the ideal element does
not determine a detailed set of consequences for a detailed state of facts. But,
in the deciding of causes, it is of great
importance and is, indeed, decisive in
new cases when there is necessity of
choosing from among equally authoritative principles. This ideal element is "a
picture of the social order of the time
and place, a legal tradition as to what
the social order is and so as to what is
the purpose of social control, which is
the authoritative background of interpretation and application of legal precepts." 45 The ideal element, in that it
presents a picture of what the legal order
ought to be and what it ought to achieve,
is undoubtedly the most important element.4 6 This is just, since in practical
science the end is first in intention and
is an element in the premises of the practical discourse. As we shall have occasion to see in greater detail later, the
ideal element has a preponderant role
when there is question of weighing interests to determine which one shall be
45 POUND,

JUSTICE

ACCORDING

TO

LAW

54

(1951); POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 28-29 (1938); Pound, A Comparison
of Ideals of Law, 47 HARV. L. REV. 2-3
(1933); Pound, The Ideal Element in American
Judicial Decision, 45 HARV. L. REV. 147-48
(1931);
Pound, The
Theory of Judicial
Decision, 21 HARV. L. REV. 958 (1923).
46 Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 21
HARV. L. REV. 958 (1923).
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recognized and to what extent it shall be
recognized.
Considering the elements just discussed
we can define law as "a body of authoritative precepts, developed and applied by
an authoritative technique in the light of
authoritative traditional ideals." 47 This
is a definition of law in its second sense,
and is the way it is used in the science
of law. It is, therefore, this sense of the
word with which we are chiefly concerned. However, at this time it would
not be without value to examine other
meanings of law given by Pound from
different points of view. Since it is extremely difficult to find a definition in
the writings of Dean Pound, the nearest
approach is descriptions from different
points of view. Besides the one just given
we find three others that consistently appear in Pound's writings.
Firstly, as a regime, law is defined as
a highly specialized form of social control
in a politically organized society exercised
through the systematic and orderly ap48
plication of the force of such a society.
It is the force of politically organized society which constitutes the formal element
of law.
From still another point of view, which
might aptly be called the origin, law is
defined as experience developed by reason and reason tested by experience; it
is experience organized and developed by
reason, authoritatively promulgated by
the lawmaking organs of society and
47POUND,

JUSTICE

ACCORDING

TO

LAW

50

JUSTICE

ACCORDING

TO

LAW

48

(1951).
4 POUND,

(1951);

Pound, My

PHILOSOPHY

OF

Philosophy of Law, My

LAW,
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AMERICAN SCHOLARS 249 (1941).
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backed by the force of that society.4 9
The importance of reason is insisted upon
throughout, but it is not reason operating
in a vacuum. It must be reason tested
and guided by experience.
Finally, viewed with regard to its end,
law is defined as a task of social engineering designed to eliminate friction
and waste in the satisfaction of unlimited
human interests and demands out of a
limited store of goods in existence.50 This
is undoubtedly the most important aspect
of Pound's doctrine of law. He insists
always that law cannot be judged with
reference to itself, as the analytical school
judges, or with respect to an ideal picture
of law, as the formalists do, but must
be judged functionally with respect to its
end. The relationship between this view
of law and the ideal element already discussed is readily seen, since it is the ideal
element which proposes the end which
the law should effect and it is with a
view to the ideal element that demands
and interests are classified and either
granted or denied recognition.
Having seen four definitions of law
from different points of view, we can
make a synthesis and achieve a composite
definition comprising all the meanings
given by Pound: Law is a system of
guides to judicial decisions, including precepts, technique, and ideals, found by
reason, tested by experience, promulgated
by the authority of politically organized
society and backed by the force of that
society, for the purpose of securing the
maximum of human interests and satisfying the maximum of human demands

with a minimum of friction and waste.
This composite definition reveals essentially the nature of law according to
Pound, but it must be elaborated in a
little more detail. He constantly refers to
law as a process of social engineering.
This, however, is somewhat misleading.
The analogy with engineering is not immediately evident. Engineering is a practical art which seeks to bring into concrete existence a plan which has been
conceived and drawn up in detail in advance. It is difficult to see that Pound
looks upon law as striving to achieve an
orderly plan which has been well formulated in advance. He expressly denies
that law is a reflection of divine reason
governing the universe or of a God-given
order.5 1 Rather it is a process of social
adjusting; a system of practical compromises of conflicting and overlapping
interests."2
In a world in which there are an unlimited number of human demands and
desires but where the means of satisfying
those demands are limited it is inevitable
that conflicts should arise. These conflicts
are resolved by giving legal effect to one
interest which thus becomes a legal right,
or simply a "right." In law we must
reconcile and adjust these conflicting interests or claims so as to secure as much
of the totality of them as we can.5
51 Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (pt.
3), 21 HARV. L. REV. 594 (1923).
52

POUND,

LAW

THE

53 POUND,

5( POUND,

(1942);

SOCIAL

CONTROL

62 (1944).
THROUGH

LAW

8 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 487 (1932).

ERA
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LAW,
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AMERICAN SCHOLARS 259 (1941);
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(1951); cfI. Pound, My Philosophy of Law, MY
PHILOSOPHY

49 POUND, THE TASK OF LAW
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Pound, Philosophical Theory and International Law, 1
BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA 89 (1923).
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It is incorrect, Pound tells us, to speak
of rights before interests have been defined, delimited, and recognized by law.
Once this has been done, "rights" are the
means by which interests are secured.
Theories of natural right erred in confusing the interest which the law should
secure with the rights by which it is secured. For Pound a natural right is
nothing other than an interest which we
think should be secured, a demand which
we think ought to be satisfied.5 4 An interest exists independently of any law
and is not a creature of the state, but
it is an error to think that it has any
binding force until defined, delimited, and
recognized by the law.
In the light of what principles are these
interests classified, defined, delimited and
recognized? Pound renounces any pretense of immutable principles or absolute
judgments. For him it is a matter of
compromise of conflicting interests.5 5 So
long as a satisfactory compromise can be
reached and we may satisfy a social want
without a disproportionate sacrifice of
other interests there are no natural, necessary reasons why we should not do so.
Not all interests can be satisfied, at least
not fully; where interests of equal valor
are in conflict they must be reconciled
5-4POUND,

THE

SPIRIT

OF

THE

COMMON

LAW

91-92 (1921).
55 "But I am skeptical as to the possibility of
an absolute judgment. We are confronted at
this point by a fundamental question of social

and political philosophy. I do not believe that
the jurist has to do more than recognize the
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and compromised so that neither is fully
satisfied nor completely sacrificed.5
Pound has outlined an elaborate hierarchical system of interests which are to
be recognized, or are pressing for recognition. It is not our intention to enter
into the practical details of his legal
theory to too great an extent, but since
this theory of interests forms the central
core of his theory it must be presented at
least in summary form. The interests
which the law should recognize and to
which it should give effect are classified
in three major groups. They are social
interests, public interests, and individual
interests.5 7 An interest, for the purpose
of the law, is a claim or demand which
human beings make either as individuals
or in groups or associations and of which
the legal order must take account. Individual interests are those claims which individuals make as individuals and assert
in title of that individual life. Public interests are those claims asserted in title
of life in politically organized society.
And, finally, social interests are those demands and claims asserted in title of social life in civilized society; they are
treated as the claims of the entire social
5,"What I do say is, that if in any field of

human conduct or in any human relation the
law, with such machinery as it has, may satisfy
a social want without a disproportionate sacrifice of other claims, there is no eternal limitation inherent in the nature of things, there
are no bounds imposed at creation, to stand
in the way of its doing so." POUND, Op. Cit.
supra note 55, at 97-98; cf. POUND, SOCIAL
78 (1942).
of Social Interests, 57

CONTROL THROUGH LAW

problem and perceive that it is presented to

5 Pound,

him as one of securing all social interests so
far as he may, of maintaining harmony among
them that is compatible with the securing of
all of them." POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 96 (1922).

HARV. L. REV. 1 (1943); cf. POUND, THE TASK
OF LAW (1944); POUND, OUTLINES OF LEC(5th ed.
1943);
TURES ON JURISPRUDENCE
POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW (1942).
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group. 58 Not every claim that men might
make is necessarily or always in one of
these groups, but when they are compared for the purpose of adjusting conflicts they must be compared with reference to the same group. In general, they
should be compared under the most general form, i.e., social interests. 59 While
the law of the last century saw only individual interests, the law today is more
and more subsuming them to social interests. Wherever a demand can be satisfied if treated as a social interest rather
than an individual one, it should be considered a social interest. 60 For this reason Dean Pound devotes most of his
planning to social interests as being the
more inclusive order.
The first of Pound's social interests is
the interest in the general security. This
is a claim that social life be secure against
forms of actions and courses of conduct
which threaten its existence. In its simplest form, this interest is concerned with
the general safety as the highest law, but
it extends to such forms as interest in
general morals, general health, peace,
order, security of transactions and of acquisitions.
Second is the social interest in the
security of social institutions, i.e., the
claim that fundamental institutions of social life be secure from courses of conduct that threaten their existence or im-

pair their efficiency. This includes interest in the security of domestic institutions,
religious institutions, political institutions,
and, more recently, economic institutions.
Pound's third social interest is in the
general morals, or the claim that social
life in civilized society be secure against
forms of action offensive to the moral
sentiments of the general body of individuals therein for the time being. This includes policies against such misdemeanors
as dishonesty, corruption, gambling and
things of immoral tendency.
Fourthly, there is the social interest in
the conservation of social resources, or
the claim that the goods of existence shall
not be wasted; that courses of conduct
which tend needlessly to destroy these
goods be restrained. This refers chiefly
to common property which is used but
not owned by individuals, and is closely
related to the interest in the protection
and training of dependents and defectives.
Fifth is the social interest in general
progress, or the demand that the development of human powers and of human
control over nature for the satisfaction of
human wants go forward; the claim that
social engineering be increasingly and
continuously improved for the development of human powers. This includes
interest in economic, political and cultural progress.

32-

Sixth, and last, is the social interest in
the individual life. This is in many ways
the most important. It is the claim that
each individual be able to live a human
life in civilized society according to the
standards of that society.

34 (5th ed. 1943); Pound, The Scope and
Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pt. 3),
25 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1912).

Such, in brief, are the social interests
which are recognized or are coming to

58 Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV.

L. REV. 1-2 (1943).
59 Id. at 2-3.
60 Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Law,
47 HARv. L. REV. 15 (1933); cf. POUND,
OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE
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be recognized by the law.6 1 When looked
at functionally, and it is in this way that
it must be viewed, 6 2 the law is an attempt
to satisfy, to reconcile, these conflicting
and overlapping interests and claims
either through securing them directly, or
through securing certain individual interests so as to give effect to the greatest
total of interests, or the interests that
weigh most, with the least possible sacrifice of the scheme of interests as a
whole.
The public and individual interests are
less elaborately treated by Pound and the
reason is not difficult to divine. From
the social interests just presented it is
possible to see how most of the public
and individual interests could be subsumed to the social interests. And where
this is possible, he finds it desirable that
it should be so done. 63 Yet he does not
neglect the public or individual interests
altogether. The public interest is, first,
the interest of the state as a juristic perG6The essentials

of this summary are taken

from Pound, supra note 58.

They may also

be found in:

POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES
ON JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1943); POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW (1942); POUND,
THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW
(1921);
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son. This interest includes the claim to
integrity, freedom of action and honor of
the state as a moral person, as well as
the claim of the state as a corporation to
hold property for corporate purpose.
And, secondly, there is the interest of
the state as the guardian of social interests.6" But, he concludes, to the extent
that the public interest is one only of the
dignity of the sovereign, it ought to give
way under modern conditions."5 As already mentioned, whenever possible the
interests should be subsumed to the social
interests as the more inclusive order. Individual interests are given a still more
summary treatment. Most of the interests
which formerly were granted as belonging
to individuals as individuals are now, he
says, subsumed under social interests.
Thus the right of the individual to possess property is taken as a social interest
in security of possessions. 66 The right to
expect exact performance of promises and
contracts is subsumed to the social interest in security of contract and transactions. 67 However, the common law is
coming more and more to recognize the
6
binding force of such promises.
It remains to be seen upon what basis
these interests are so classified and either
recognized or denied recognition. Pound
believes that the basis for such a classification is what he calls the presupposi64Pound,

A

Survey

of

Public Interests, 58

HARV. L. REV. 910 (1945).
65Id. at 925.
66 Pound,
A Survey of Social Interests, 57
HARv. L. REV. 1, 20 (1943); cf. POUND, AN
INTRODUCTION

'10 THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF

LAW

234 (1922).
67 Pound, supra note 66; cf. POUND, op. cit.
supra note 66, at 237.
684 ENCYC. Soc. ScI. 42 (1932).
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tions of civilization, or, the "jural postulates." These are the reasonable expectations which all men have in civilized
society. They are the minimum requirements in order that that society may
survive.69 Stated briefly these postulates
are, first, in civilized society men must
be able to assume that men will commit
no intentional aggressions upon them.
Secondly, we must assume that men may
control for beneficial purposes what they
have discovered and appropriated for
their own use, created by their own labor,
or acquired according to the existing social and economic order. Third, we must
assume that those with whom we deal
will act in good faith, making good their
promises, carrying out their undertakings
according to the expectations of the moral sentiment of the community, and restoring specifically or by equivalent what
comes to them by mistake or in any way
whereby they receive at another's expense
what they could not expect to receive
under other circumstances. Fourth, we
must assume that men will act with due
care not to cast on others an unreasonable risk of injury. And, finally, we assume that those who keep things, such as
animals, which are likely to get out of
hand and do damage will restrain them
within proper bounds. 0
69 POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW 169-79, 188 (1922); cf. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS
OF
LEGAL
HISTORY
148-49

(1923); POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW

112 (1942);

POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COM-

MON LAW 82 (1921).
Pound admits borrowing these postulates from Kohler. Cf. KOHLER,
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 83 (1914).

In the light of these "jural postulates"
the various interests which press for recognition are examined, defined, delimited
and, if recognition is granted, they are
secured by the law.
The End of Law
What the end of law should be according to Pound has already been briefly
intimated but since it plays such a preponderant role in his legal theory it must
receive greater consideration than already
given.
Analyzing the history of law Pound
finds three theories of the end of law
that have been held successively in legal
history and a fourth which is beginning
to assert itself. The first, and simplest,
which existed in the period of primitive
law, was that of keeping the peace at
any price.71 Under the influence of
Greek philosophers this was superseded
by the second theory which was one of
preserving the status quo. This theory
maintained itself through the period of
classical Roman law, and, except for a
brief interruption of primitive law under
German influence, through the Middle
Ages. 72 According to this theory, the
end of law is to insure social stability by
putting everybody in his place and keeping him there. Emphasis is on the social
order, with the individual destined to
serve that order at all costs to personal
liberty.
Jurisprudence,

ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 913, 92021 (1942); POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL
HISTORY 148-49 (1923).

11POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 72-74 (1922); POUND, THE SPIRIT

7O POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY

OF THE COMMON

OF LAW 169-79, 188 (1922); cf. FRIEDMANN,
LEGAL THEORY 233 (2d ed. 1949); De Sloov~re,

72 POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY

LAW 85-87 (1921).

OF LAW 78-79 (1922).
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With the beginning of law in the
modern sense, after the Protestant Revolution, the emphasis shifted from society to
the individual. At first the purpose of
law was conceived as securing natural
rights, which got their warrant from the
inherent moral qualities of man; there
should be no restraint for any other purpose. In the nineteenth century, this
mode of thought turned metaphysical with
juristic emphasis on individual consciousness; the social problem was one of
reconciling conflicting human wills. Kant
had rationalized the law in these terms
as a system of principles or universal
rules applied to human actions whereby
the free will of each might coexist with
the free will of all others making a maximum of self-expression the end of law.
Hegel also emphasized liberty and
rationalized law as an idea of liberty
being realized in human experience.
Bentham considered law as a body of
rules laid down and enforced by the state,
the end of which was to secure a maximum of happiness conceived as free inSpencer also
dividual self-assertion.
conceived of the function of law as
promotion, the liberty of each limited

end of law as the maximum of selfassertion jurists began to think of it as
the maximum satisfaction of wants and
interests. The problem for jurisprudence
became one of finding the criteria of the

only by the liberty of all. 73

SCHOLARS 250-52 (1941):

In any of

these ways, the end of law was conceived
as that of securing the greatest possible
individual self-assertion.
Toward the end of the last century
and the beginning of the present, the
emphasis in juristic thinking began to
shift from human wills to human wants
or desires. Instead of thinking of the

relative value of interests.7 4

this German Interessenjurisprudenz, developed from the ideas of Ihering, and
gave it its greatest elaboration in his
sociological jurisprudence.
Law is spoken of by Pound as one
75
very specialized form of social control.
As such, the end of law must ultimately
be the same as the entire system of social
control, the other agencies of which are
morals, religion, family and school. And
so he tells us that the end of law is, at
bottom, the end of social control.76 But
the other agencies of social control no
77
longer exercise an organized effect.
Hence, in modern society, law has be78
come the paramount agency.
74 POUND,

73 POUND,

op. cit. supra note 72, at 83-84;

194 (1921).
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89;
19-20

POUND,

JUSTICE

(1951);

cf. POUND, NEW PATHS OF THE LAW

4-5 (1950).
75Compare the definitions
in footnotes 48-50 supra.
76PoUND,

of law as found

My Philosophy of Law, My

PHI-

LOSOPHY OF LAW, CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN

"If, as lawyers must,

we look at law, in all of its senses, functionally
with respect to its end, as the end is at bottom
the end of social control, our science of law
cannot be self-sufficient. Ethics has to do with
another great agency of social control covering
much of the ground covered by the legal
order and having much to tell us as to what
legal precepts ought to be and ought to bring
about."
,7

POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW

21-

25 (1942).
78

POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW

Pound adopts

POUND, op. cit. supra note 77, at 20:

"In

the modern world law has become the paramount agency of social control. Our main reliance in the society of today is upon the force
of politically organized society."

RoscoE POUND
Now, we can ask, what is the end of
social control of which law is the paramount agency? It is defined as an ideal
of co-operation toward civilization, to
raising human powers to their highest
possible unfolding, to a maximum of
human control over external and internal
nature for human purposes.79 Pound is
speaking in the same vein when he refers
to law as giving external support to man's
social instincts as against his selfish,
aggressive instincts, approving the opinions
of some last-century jurists who spoke of
law and government as extensions of individual self-control.,' Law, unlike the
laws of physical sciences which are
based on observation of what is, must be
based on experience and observation of
what ought to be, of how men ought to
conduct themselves in relation with
others. 8 ' The law is compared to some
traffic regulations, such as lines in the
op. cit. supra note 77, at 127,
132: "An ideal of civilization of raising human
powers to their highest possible unfolding of
the maximum of human control over external
nature and over internal nature for human
purposes .. "; Cf. POUND, A SURVEY OF SOCIAL
"Social interest in genINTERESTS 30 (1943):
eral progress, that is the claim . . . that the
development of human powers and of human
control over nature for the satisfaction of
human wants go forward, the demand that
social engineering be increasingly and continuously improved, as it were the self-assertion of
the social group toward higher and more complete development of human powers."
80 POUND, THE TASK OF LAW 25-26 (1944).
81 POUND, op. cit. supra note 80, at 49; POUND,
(1942):
SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 32
"But we are not dealing with physical nature,
as to which opinions of good and bad and
criticisms of its phenomena are irrelevant. We
are dealing with phenomena in the domain and
under the control of the human will and that
Here the
it does not tell the whole story.
ultimate question is always what ought to be.
151POUND,

middle of a road, which direct human
82
Still
actions the way they ought to go.
using traffic regulations as an example, he
tells us that law must form habits of
proper behavior instead of waiting for
them to develop,89 even though the reasonableness of the law is not apparent at
once to all. In still other instances he
says that the end of law is justice, which
in turn is defined as "an ideal relation

among men."

84

Looked at functionally with respect to
its end, which is the end of social control,
It depends
law is not self-sufficient.
upon other agencies, especially ethics, to
point out what legal precepts ought to be
85
and what they ought to effect.
This presentation of the end of law
would be readily acceptable to any
scholastic philosopher and it is all found
in Pound's writings. However, he frequently contradicts these statements or
qualifies them until they have no meaning, or at least, no acceptable meaning
left. Thus the highest development of
human powers 86 loses some of its lofty
appeal in his survey of social interests
when he goes on to explain that this fifth
interest, which he calls the "social interest in general progress," 87 covers
."
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such major policies as freedom of property, free trade and protection from
monopoly, free industry, and encouragement of inventions, as well as a policy of
political progress through free criticism,
free education and the like.""
The conflict between selfish instinct
and social instincts 89 which law is to help
control is seen to be a conflict between
moral virtue and justice. The selfassertive instincts are identified with individual moral development and the social instincts with justice. The two are
seen to be in essential conflict. Hence
law must maintain one set of moral
values against another.90
By justice as the end of law, Pound
does not mean an individual virtue; nor
does he mean the ideal relation among
men. Rather he means a regime, an
adjustment of relations and ordering of
conduct so as to satisfy the maximum of
88 Ibid.
89 Cf. note 10 supra.
0

' POUND, THE

TASK OF LAW 25, 36 (1944):

"Undoubtedly there are inherent difficulties in
a regime of justice according to law. But we
must pay a price for order, security, and a
developed economic order. We must pay a
price for a balance of security, justice in the
sense of the ideal relation among men, and
morals in the sense of the highest individual
development. No one of these can be carried
out to a logical extreme at the expense of the
others. Free individual self-assertion-spontaneous free activity-on the one hand, and
ordered, even regimented cooperation, are both
agencies of civilization. A social order which
ignores and would repress either is not moving
toward the highest unfolding of human powers." Cf. POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW
21 (1951), citing Radbruch whom Dean Pound
had just referred to as the ". . . foremost philosopher of law . . . in the present generation"
as saying there is an irreducible antimony between justice, morals and security.
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human claims and desires with a minimum of friction and waste.9 1 This tells
us not only what law does but also what
92
it ought to do.
Sources of Law
In considering the question of the
sources of law there are two major problems.
First, there is question of the
proximate authoritative sources from
which the existing legal precepts are
drawn. Secondly, there is the issue of
the source of the authority of the law as
such. 93 The second of these poses three
distinct problems: the immediate practical
source, the ultimate practical source, and
the ultimate moral source of the authority
of law.9 4 In dealing with the first problem the term "source" has been, and still
is, used to mean at least four different
things: the authoritative texts which are
the bases of juristic and doctrinal development; the "raw materials" from which
judges derive the grounds for deciding
cases; the formulating agencies by which
rules and principles are shaped; and the
literary shapes in which precepts are
found. This last Pound prefers to call
"form" rather than "source" of law. 95
All of these answer the questions of how
and by whom the content of the precepts
has been worked out, and whence they
l POUND,

SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 64-

65 (1942).
92Pound, My

Philosophy of Law, My

Pm-

LOSOPHY OF LAW, CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN
SCHOLARS 252 (1941).
o9 POUND,
SOURCES AND
FORMS OF LAW 3

(1946).
94 POUND,

SOURCES

AND

FORMS

OF

LAW

5

(1946); POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW
51 (1942).
!) POUND, op. cit. supra note 93, at 3-5.

RoscOE POUND
derived their content as distinct from
their force and authority. 96
A. Source of Content
Considering the factors to which legal
precepts owe their content, Pound finds
there are six: usage, religion, moral and
philosophical ideas, adjudication, scientific
discussion and legislation. 9
Usage becomes a source of law when
a rule or principle that has been worked
out and formulated by common usage is
given the authority of law by courts or
legislature. The usage of merchants is an
example. 98 Religion, in earlier stages of
legal development, was a principal
source. In modem law, particularly on
the Continent, the influence of the law
of the Church is still evident; 19 moral
and philosophical ideas have their influence not only in affecting old precepts
but also in shaping, or helping to shape
new ones. This is particularly true in
times when equity and natural law are a
predominant force and there is a tendency
to identify law and morals. 10 Adjudication gives rise to a tradition of judicial
action as usage gives rise to a tradition
of popular action. In civil law systems,
where legislative precepts rather than
judicial decisions form the starting point
for legal reasoning, a settled course of
decision may be a form rather than a
source of law. In common-law systems
a course of judicial decisions which has
only persuasive authority is a form rather

than a source. But if the decisions are
so well formulated that they are adopted
by a higher court they become authoritative and so are a source of law. 0'
Scientific discussion is a source of law
when the discussions of text writers and
commentators are given formal authority
by being embodied in the decisions and
statutes of courts or legislatures. Doctrinal
writing has been a very important agency
in formulating our law. "While in form
our law is chiefly the work of judges, in
great part judges simply put the guinea
stamp of the state's authority upon propositions which they found worked out
Their creative
for them in advance.
work was often a work of intelligent
selection." 102 Finally legislation or direct
formulation of legal precepts by the lawmaking organs of the state is an important source of law. This is a particularly important source in civil law
jurisdictions, while it is less so in common-law systems, and, in America, has
made no lasting contribution to law. 103
Briefly, the forms or literary shapes in
which the common law of the United
States are found authoritatively expressed
are seven: 1) decisions of old English
courts (before the American Revolution);
2) American judicial decisions, after the
Revolution; 3) judicial decisions of English and other common-law jurisdictions
since the Revolution; 4) the Law Mer101 POUND,

9CPOUND, op. cit. supra note 93, at 5.
07

POUND, op. cit. supra note 93, at 5-9.

102 POUND,

98 Ibid.
90 POUND,

THE

SPIRIT

OF

THE

COMMON

SOURCES

AND

FORMS

OF LAW

25

(1946).
LAW

ch. 2 (1921); cf. Puritanism and the Common
Law, ANN. PROC. KAN. B. ASS'N (1910).
00 POUND, LAW AND MORALS (1924); Law and
Morals, ANN. PROC. W. VA. B. ASS'N (1915).

op. cit. supra note 101, at 7-8; cf.

POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN
LAW 42-43 (1938).
103 POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN
LAW

(1938);

POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COM-

MON LAW (1921);

POUND,

TO AMERICAN LAW

(1920).
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chant; 5) the Canon Law of the Church
in some matters such as probate and
divorce; 6) International Law; and 7)
English statutes before the Revolution so
far as they were applicable and received
04
into the United States law.1
From the foregoing it is seen that a
developed legal system is made up of two
elements: a customary or traditional element, and an imperative or legislative
element. The customary element must
not be thought to derive from a customary
mode of popular action. It is rather a
product of customary modes of professional or juristic handling of controversies
and is developed by professional writing
and teaching. 05 The imperative element
is that part of the legal system in the
form of rules or standards authoritatively
promulgated by the legislative bodies of
the state prior to judicial decisions, and
usually prior to action.'
One more point remains for brief consideration in connection with the content
of legal precepts. We have just seen the
There remain
origin of the precepts.
the modes of growth, or to use Maine's
expression, the "agencies by which law
is brought into harmony with society." 107
The agencies of growth through the traditional element are eight: fictions, interpretation, equity, natural law, juristic
science, judicial empiricism, comparative
law, and sociological studies. 08 In the
imperative element there are five stages
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of development: unconscious legislation,
declaratory legislation, selection and
amendment, conscious constructive legislation, and habitual legislation as an
ordinary agency which often culminates
in codification. 1 9
Source of the Authority of Law
The source of the content of legal
precepts could be developed at much
greater length. However, it is a question
of technical nature, of interest primarily
to the jurist and legal historian. 110 For
our present purpose the source of the
authority of law is of primary concern.
This problem is not so elaborately developed by Pound as the former, but it provides a better clue as to his philosophy. As
already indicated,", this question poses
three distinct problems.
The first problem is that of the immediate practical source of the authority
of the legal order. This is found to be
in the legislative and administrative bodies
of politically organized society and backed
by the force of that society." 2
The second question, that of the
ultimate practical source of authority,
Pound considers to be a question for
political science to solve. However, he
submits, in our political theory we have
come to accept the theory that the source
is consent-the consent of a free people
to be ruled by a government of their own
choosing and by laws which they approve. 1 13
B.

1091d. at 74-75.
104POUND, op. cit. supra note 101, at 32; cf.
POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW

(1938).
105 POUND,

SOURCES

AND

FORMS

OF LAW

37

"

0

See POUND,

SOURCES AND

FORMS

OF LAW

(1946).
I" Cf. note 94 supra.
112

Cf. POUND,

(1946).
1oG Id. at 70.
107 Id. at 40.

5

(1946);

108 Ibid.

(1942).
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SOCIAL CONTROL

OF LAW
THROUGH

LAW 51 (1942).
113 POUND,

SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 52
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Turning now to the ultimate moral
source of the authority of law Pound
notes that in the classical juristic theory it
was held that law deduced its authority
directly from justice and derived its binding force from justice of which it is
declaratory. Today, the dominant legal
philosophy tells us we cannot speak of an
ultimate moral source. But he submits
that the legal order has kept authority
because it performs, and performs well,
the task of social engineering; in other
words, because it works."'
It might well be asked upon what
premises this work of social engineering
is effected, upon what principles we select
and classify, compromise and reconcile
the overlapping and conflicting demands
which press for recognition. We cannot
reconcile conflicting demands except in
the light of some principle of justice, some
idea as to the end of law. Pound tells
us that in the past the process of social
engineering has been governed by ideals
of the end of law and the legal and social
order, and so it should be today.' 15 But,
114

Id. at 53:

"The classical juristic theory is

that law may be deduced directly from justice,
from the ideal relation between men, and owes
its binding force to the binding force of
justice which it declares. The dominant legal
philosophy of today tells us that we cannot
answer this question. . . . But the legal
order goes on, whatever may be the basis of
whatever rightful authority it has, and I submit
it has kept and holds authority because it performs, and performs well, its task of reconciling
and harmonizing conflicting and overlapping
human demands and so maintains a social
order in which we may maintain and further
civilization."
See also Pound, The Pioneers
and the Common Law, 27 W. VA. L. REV. 1
(1920).
115 POUND, THE THEORY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS

953 (1923):
"In the past it has been governed
and its path defined by ideals of the end of.law

he continues, for our purposes today we
do not have to be guided by any Godgiven order laid down once and for all,
nor by any reflection of this divine reason
governing the whole universe." 6 For our
purposes, he continues, and the point is
sufficiently significant to warrant direct
quotation: "If but his precept is otherwise good social engineering, it is quite
immaterial what are the premises of the
legislative lawmaker or how he develops
them or whether he has any premises at
all." 117
Is it possible that law can achieve its
purpose without principles, that justice
can be really attained by a process of
compromising and reconciling conflicting
claims? If a compromise has been successfully effected in a controversy can
we really say that justice has been realized? For Pound the answer must necessarily be affirmative."" The judicial process is one not of seeking a reasonable
principle of justice but of a trial and
error method of finding the workable
legal precept."19 The workableness, the
and of the legal and social order, and it is
submitted that such ideals must be our reliance
today and tomorrow."
"'ild. at 954.
117

Id. at 956.

118 Cf. Pound, My

Philosophy of

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, CREDOS
AMERICAN SCHOLARS 252 (1941).
119 POUND, op. cit. supra note

OF

Law, My
SIXTEEN

115, at 953:
"Our chief agency of lawmaking is judicial empiricism-the judicial search for the workable
legal precept, for the principle which is fruitful
of good results in giving satisfactory grounds
of decision of actual causes, for the legal
conception into which the facts of actual controversies may be fitted with results that accord
with justice between the parties to concrete
litigation. It is a process of trial and error
with all the advantages and disadvantages of
such a process." Cf. POUND, THE FORMATIVE
ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 124 (1938).

13
functional approach, is always stressed
rather than the intrinsic reasonableness of
legal precepts. Therefore, because the
intrinsic reason and justice of rules do
not give them an unchallengeable authority, he approved the jurists of the last

century who rejected natural law. 2 '
Necessarily connected with the question of the source of the authority of law
is that of the source of rights and obligations. By reviewing Pound's opinions
as to the source of these rights and obli-

gations we obtain a clearer insight into
his theory of law.
Looking first at the question of rights,
Pound reviews opinions of his predecessors and notes that, in antecedent legal
theories, it was commonly held that rights
were a necessary consequence of human
nature and pertained to man simply because he is man. They thought of law
as giving effect to these rights simply
because they are natural rights. 12 1 Now,
120 POUND, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (1923): "Yet the jurists of
the last century were right in their judgment
that the classical law-of-nature philosophy could
serve them no longer. They did not perceive
that the facts of political life which it assumed
and interpreted were changing fundamentally.
But they did perceive vividly that its theory
of the source of legal obligation was unsuited
to the times. A theory that found the binding
force of legal rules in the intrinsic reason and
justice of the rules themselves did not put behind its rules the unchallengeable basis of
authority which men have been eager to provide for the law of the land." CI. 8 ENCYC.
Soc. SCl. 483 (1932).
1218 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 489 (1932):
"Where
the nineteenth century thought of law as existing to give effect to natural rights . ..
jurists since Ihering have thought of recognizing, delimiting and securing interests.
It is
conceived that a legal system attains its end
by recognizing certain interests, by defining
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however, we should speak rather of interests than of rights. These interests are
the demands or desires which human
beings, living in society, seek to satisfy
and of which the legal order must take
account. These interests do not, however,
give rise to an unchallengeable claim
against society, or against other individuals, until they have been defined, delimited, and given legal recognition within
the defined limits. They are similar to

what jurists used to call natural rights in
that they are not created by law and
would exist independently of law.
"[M]uch of a kernel of truth . . . was in
the old ideas of a state of nature and in

the theory of natural rights."

122

We can illustrate this shift in emphasis

by one concrete example, the right to
property.

Pound sees in the institution

of property not a natural right which is
given effect by legal precept, but a wise
bit of social engineering.

Private prop-

erty is a way of satisfying more interests,
more demands and desires with a mini12 3
mum of friction and waste.
the limits within which these interests shall be
recognized legally and given effect through legal
precepts and by endeavoring to secure the
interests so recognized within the defined
limits. For such a theory an interest may be
defined within the defined limits. For such a
theory an interest may be defined as a demand
or desire which human beings, either individually or in groups, seek to satisfy and of which
therefore the ordering of human relations must
take account ..
"
1221bid.; cf. POUND, THE TASK OF LAW 26-30
(1944); POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 41-43 (1922).
123 POUND,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 234 (1922): "Social-utilitarian
theories explain and justify property as an institution which secures a maximum of interests
or satisfies a maximum of wants, conceiving it
to be a sound and wise bit of social engineering

Roscoe POUND
Turning next to the root of obligations,
Pound finds this also to be in social interest. Emphasis is no longer on the individual will but upon the desires and
claims

society.12 4

civilized

in

involved

The basis for delictual fault is a jural
postulate of civilized society that men
act with due care 125 and the basis for
delictual liability is the social interest in
the general security.

2

The obligation to

when viewed with reference to its results. This
is the method of Professor Ely's well-known
book on Property and Contract. No one has
yet done so, but I suspect one might combine
this mode of thought with the civilization interpretation of the neo-Hegelians and argue
that the system of individual property, on the
whole, conduces to the maintaining and furthering of civilization-to the development of
human powers to the most of which they are
capable-instead of viewing it as a realization
of the idea of civilization as it unfolds in human
experience. Perhaps the theories of the immediate future will run along some such lines.
For we have had no experience of conducting
civilization on any other basis, and the waste
and friction involved in going to any other
basis must give us pause.
Moreover, whatever we do, we must take account of the instinct of acquisitiveness and of individual claims
grounded thereon.
We may believe that the
law of property is a wise bit of social engineering in the world as we know it, and that we
satisfy more human wants, secure more interests,
with a sacrifice of less thereby than by anything
we are likely to devise-we may believe this
without holding that private property is eternally and absolutely necessary and that human
society may not expect in some civilization,
which we cannot forecast, to achieve something
different and something better." See also POUND,
A SURVEY OF SOCIAL INTERESTS (1943); POUND,
THE

SPIRIT

OF

THE

COMMON

196-98

LAW

(1921).
124

POUND,

A

SURVEY

(1943); POUND,

AN
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
125 POUND,

AN

LOSOPHY OF LAWN
12C Id. at 177.

OF

SOCIAL

INTERESTS

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE

169 (1922).

INTRODUCTION

keep promises or to honor contracts
comes not from the will of the person
who binds himself, but from the social
1 27
interest in the security of transactions.
It is wise social engineering. If we think
that it is the order of nature it is only
because the habitual application of the
rules of an art come to be taken for
28

granted.1

Evaluation and Critique
In the light of the expos6 just presented of Pound's legal doctrine, we may
evaluate, both positively and negatively,
his contribution to the advancement of
jurisprudence. Recalling the problems
presented in the first chapter we may well
inquire to what extent he has been successful in solving or alleviating those difficulties. Naturally every solution of such
a problem cannot be attributed to him
directly and individually, but in the development of American law during the
last half-century, he has a pre-eminent
role. Even yet he is not satisfied that the
law is perfect, but it must be admitted
that there have been many improvements
since he spoke in St. Paul in 1906.129
Id. at 188-90, 237; cf. Pound, Individual Interests of Substance-Promised Advantages, 49
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1945).
128 POUND, op. cit. supra note 125, at 278: "Two
127

circumstances operate to keep the requirements
of consideration alive in our law of simple con-

tract. One is the professional feeling that the
common law is in an idealized form of natural
law and that its actual rules are declaratory of
natural law. This mode of thinking is to be
found in all professions and is a result of
habitual application of the rules of an art until
they are taken for granted."
129We cannot agree with the observation of
Edmond Cahn that Pound appears ".

TO

THE

170, 188-90 (1922).

PHI-

.

. so

well satisfied with the law as it now is." See
Cahn, Jurisprudence, ANN. SURVEY AM. L.
1160 (1944). From the time of his first
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Pound's main endeavor has been in the
field of legal education. In this domain
alone he has contributed enormously
towards raising the standards required for
the legal profession. Not only has he assisted in improving the basic requirements for admission to the legal profession, but also, by his voluminous reading
and writing, he has helped to create a
30
widespread interest in legal philosophy.1
If there is a growing interest in natural
law now in America, as there seems to
be,13 ' there can be no doubt but that
Pound helped to foster it. Though not a
strong advocate of natural law himself,
he has been largely responsible for introducing European ideas of legal philosophy
into America. Realizing that there did
exist a generation of lawyers who studied
law solely in terms of law divorced from
all other social phenomena, he has striven, both in and out of the classroom, to
bring about a closer alliance between law
and the other social sciences."'
Pound's efforts in the field of education
have been productive of some good results elsewhere. It has helped to overcome much of the "juristic pessimism"
of which he spoke.133 It has enabled
other lawyers, as well as himself, to adapt
the laws of the country to changed social
and economic circumstances.
Dean Pound has certainly achieved a
major address, note 1 supra, until his book,
Justice According to Law, he has been seeking

and suggesting methods for improving
law.
3
0 Cf. note 7 supra.
1-3

Cf. Utz, Neue Str6mungen in der Nordam-

erikanischen Rechtsphilosophie, 1949-50
FUER RECHTS-UND

SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE

cf. note 30 supra.
133 C. note 18 supra.
132
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great personal success in winning adherents to his legal theory. He has earned
for himself a host of friends, admirers
and followers nationally and internationally. Yet it cannot be said that his every
effort was positive contribution. Many of
his observations and conclusions merit
critical examination.
A.

Historical Critique
Our historical critique is not going to
be prolonged to include every historical
observation, nor is it to be specifically
detailed. However, there are a few points
which need to be corrected. If it is not
too pedantic to bring up such a point, it
should be said, as a general criticism,
that he is guilty of a methodological error
on a grand scale. Time after time he
cites various authors with never a reference to the locus. The reader is left without an easy opportunity to read the text
in its context. It is extremely difficult, to
the point of impossibility, to check all the
references. In The Spirit of the Common
Law, which he considers his most important work, Pound cites more than sixty
individual authors, either directly or indirectly, besides groups of schools of
legal thought, without one reference note.
For this reason we do not know his
source of information when he writes
about Aristotle, but he certainly could not
have been reading Aristotle's text. Pound
calls Aristotle the first of the mechanical
jurists, for he held that the rule of law
was to be applied strictly without regard
134
for the justice of the individual case.
Pound professed a great admiration for
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38.

C.
POUND,
AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 109-10 (1922); POUND,
THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 86 (1921).
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Kohler, yet had he read Kohler correctly
he would have discovered that Kohler
admired Aristotle for just the opposite. 3 '
However, it is not necessary to go to
Kohler for approval of Aristotle. The
text of Aristotle makes it clear that he
looked on the judge as a sort of animate
justice. 136 He considered equity a correc137
tion of the law.
Since Pound makes the same comments with regard to St. Thomas Aquinas
as he did of Aristotle, we can turn for
contradictory evidence to Thomas' commentaries on the same text of Aristotle.
According to Pound, St. Thomas conceived the end of law to be one of
putting everybody in his place and keeping him there. 1 38 As to the application
of law in particular case, the Scholastics,
says Pound, ignored the moral aspects of
the case, asking only if the prescribed
legal forms were followed. 13 9 In his commentary on Aristotle, St. Thomas also
tells us plainly that the judge is considered to be a sort of incarnate justice
in that his mind is totally possessed with
justice. 1'40 Likewise he praises equity as
being more excellent in that it observes
the intention of the legislator when his
words are at variance with justice in an
individual case. For the legislator, he
35KOHLER,

PHILOSOPHY

OF

LAW

6-7,

86

(1914).
136Aristotle,

Nicomachean Ethics, in 5

BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE

THE

(1941).

13T Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 5 id. at

1137b10.
13S

POUND,

THE SPIRIT OF THE

COMMON

says, looks to the plurality of cases, but
is aware that his rule may not fit every
particular case. So the judge, in resorting to equity to attain justice in an
individual case, is doing what the
1 41
legislator would do if he were there.
Pound's contention that the Scholastics
conceived of law as a matter of mere
authority can hardly be reconciled with
the definition of St. Thomas. For Pound,
reason came into the law after the
Reformation. 141 St. Thomas defines law
as essentially an act of reason.143 As
to its end, law is ordered to the common
good 14 and not to putting everybody in
his place by force and keeping him there.
The common good includes the ultimate
happiness of all the members.
Dean Pound appears to have been too
easily convinced by a popular Renaissance
notion that the middle ages were dark
ages. Had he investigated the Scholastic
writers more carefully, rather than taking
the word of a secondary source, he
could not possibly have come to the
conclusions he did. In helping to perpetuate a story that is no longer believed
by prudent historians, he has rendered
a disservice to scholarship in general as
well as to jurisprudence. It is unbelievable that a man of Pound's intellectual
ability could commit so gross an error
if the doctrine of St. Thomas on law had
ever once been presented to him objectively.
Turning to contemporary scholars we

LAW

op. cit. supra note 140, lect. 16.
A Comparison of Ideals of Law,
47 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1933).

86-87, 98 (1921).

'41

39 Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36
HARV. L. REV. 658 (1923).

142Pound,
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AQUINAS,
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LIBRos
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EXPOSITo,

lect. 6, No. 955 (Marietti ed. 1934).

bk. V,

AQUINAS,

143 AQUINAS,
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Id. at I-I,

q. 90, art. 2.

I-I, q. 90, art.
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find that Dean Pound takes suitable
phrases or ideas out of context and uses
them to his own advantage.
It has
already been noted that from Kohler he
takes thee jural postulates by a scissorsand-paste method while rejecting the
principles upon which they were con45
ceived by Kohler.'
In a like manner, Pound claims to take
his scheme of social interests from
Ihering. For Ihering an interest presupposes a right and the interest is artificially
stimulated, if necessary, in order to maintain rights. For Pound, on the contrary,
there are only interests which the law
may or may not recognize.
Private
property for example, is considered by
Pound to be a wise bit of social engineering, a way of securing more interests. For
Ihering, property is a part of personality
extended to things.'1 46
To speak of
property in terms of interest is, for him,
a degeneration of the proper sense of
property and a denial of its natural
basis. ' 7 In short, if one's knowledge of
Ihering were limited to what can be
gained from Pound it would be very
inexact.
In effect he has taken from
Ihering only the terminology of "interests"
and given it an altogether different meaning.
Another case in point is G~ny. Where
he speaks of science and technique as
necessary to law, Pound takes only the
elements of technique as though that were
all that was mentioned by Gfny. Grny
is the foremost natural-law legal scholar
in France, and it would be an injustice
145 POUND,
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to him to intimate that he extolls technique over science in law. But there is
nothing to be gained by multiplication of
examples. This method of citation is
destined only to deceive. The use of convenient texts does not in any considerable
extent change the essential pragmatism of
Pound's legal theory.
B.

Philosophical Critique
A philosophical critique of Pound's
legal theory is much more difficult since
there is very little of philosophy to be
found therein. This is not intended as
a harsh criticism since he makes no great
pretense at philosophy and very aptly
refers to his theory as sociological jurisprudence. Nevertheless there are fundamental presuppositions, the lack of
which is itself a matter of investigation
in legal theory.
With Pound the difficulty is made
greater by reason of his extraordinarily
loose use of language and distrust of, or
disrespect for, logic. One well known
American professor of law was almost
driven to despair when he could not understand the legal Realists. But he felt
relieved to learn that Pound could not
understand them, nor could they understand him. 148 The fact is, he rarely makes
a statement of consequence without surrounding it with so many qualifying and
conditional phrases that one wonders at
the end if he is speaking or quoting.
However, even with the lack of logic and
loose language a few notions do emerge
distinctly.
Definition of Law: It has already
been noted that Pound gives various

150 (1923).
146 IHERING, DER KAMPF 40.

247 Ibid.

148Lucey, Natural Law and American Legal
Realism, 30 GEO. L.J. 493-94 (1942).
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descriptions of law but never arrives at
a precise definition. 149
Each of the
descriptions reveals something of his
philosophy of law but no one of them,
nor even all of them taken together,
gives a clear notion of what he means
by law. Nevertheless, by considering not
only the descriptions of law which he
gives, but also the various meanings of
law which he criticizes, one can gain a
clearer concept of what he himself understands by law.
Thus Pound criticizes the ancient jurists
because they considered the purpose of
law to be the maintenance of peace. It
is, therefore, clear that for Pound law
is not an instrument for securing and
maintaining peace in society.
Likewise he criticizes Aristotle and the
scholastics for holding that the end of
law is the maintenance of the status quo.
The historical dubiety of this point has
already been indicated. But from his
criticism of this alleged purpose it is
clear that for Pound the end of law is
not the preservation of the existing order
in society.
On the other hand, he says, using
Ihering's system of social interests, law
is not in the person but in society. It
is clear that, for Pound, law and rights
are not in the person. In each person
there are only interests which he seeks
to have recognized.
Only when the
interests are recognized can we speak of
rights. Each individual seeks his own
proper good by pressing for the recognition of his interests.
Likewise Pound takes from Gcny the
element of technique. It has already
49 See text at note 39 supra.

been pointed out that for Geny the element of technique is always secondary to
the science and is at the service of
science to realize the ends which the
science of law proposes. But, as interpreted by Pound, the technique of G~ny
becomes a means of attaining an order
of peace among those who seek to
satisfy their own interests.
Taking the various descriptions which
he gives, and the criticisms of other
jurists, we see that, for Pound, law is a
compromise imposed by authority in a
society where each one seeks his own
interests. This definition, however, has
special qualities.
It is not a pure
positivist definition as, for example, we
find in Kelsen. For Kelsen there is no
recognition of personality but only pure
law. For him the notion of law is derived
purely from law as such, abstracting from
any concept of personality or of any
given society of persons. For Lauterpacht also, law is defined as an instrument of order in a society with no consideration of the persons in the society or
of the determined structure of the society. Del Vecchio also gives a definition
of law in which he envisages a determined society but abstracts from the internal structure of the society.
For Pound, on the other hand, there is
always a real element since he sees law
as an instrument in a free society, a
society in which he takes into consideration the liberty of all who seek their personal development. For this reason he
is certainly not a positivist in the sense
of Kelsen. We recognize here a realization of a demand of natural law, that
is, that the definition of law must imply
the real human nature, or a society of
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free men. Unfortunately, however, with
Pound it is not human nature as
universally given.
Despite this approach to natural law,
there is in his conception of law an
element far removed from natural law,
properly speaking.
From Ihering he
takes the notion of interests and develops
it as though there were no rights in the
person but only interests which struggle
for recognition. It is thus clear that for
Pound rights and law exist only in society and not in persons. Parenthetically,
it might be said that there is a sense in
which this is correct, for if there were
only one person in the world there would
be no law. Law formally exists as a
relation among several free, moral subjects. Nevertheless, what exists before
this formal law is more than a personal
interest only. There is a real law realized
in the same nature of the several subjects,
as we shall explain in more detail later.
Dean Pound believes law is an instrument of organization in a concrete
political society where each seeks his own
interests. But according to natural law
one can well imagine that, before the
state, there is a society founded upon
human nature as such. While it is true
that in one sense society has a primacy
over the individual, it is also true that
man exists before the actual creation of
the state, and carries his personal rights
into the state which he founds. The
rights of the individual are not creations
of the state, but, as Pound remarks regarding interests, they exist in the person
independently of any state. Certainly, law
always exists in any social organization.
But this social organization precedes
positive legislation, being included in the
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social, not only individual, nature of man.
For this reason it is clear that Pound
does not take all of human reality into
consideration, although he does not abstract completely from human personality
as do some other jurists. But since he
does not consider all of human reality he
remains outside the natural-law concept
of law and closer to the positivist
definition.
Finality: Considering finality as it is
found in law, Pound approaches the
idealists and also, to a certain extent, the
natural-law jurists.
A philosophy of
pure law, such as advocated by Kelsen
for example, eliminates all finality and
considers only the operation of pure
positive law. Pound, on the contrary,
introduces the notion of finality into his
conception of law.
However, the notion of finality with
which Pound is concerned tends to confuse juridical politics and the finality of
law itself. What he is really concerned
with is the finality as found in juridical
politics. In this sense all idealists, such
as Stammler and Del Vecchio, admit a
finality. But juridical politics is not law;
it does not establish a juridical order. It
is rather the antecedent effort to establish a juridical order. In the juridical
order itself Pound does not admit of a
finality but rather of a conflict of competing interests which seek for recognition.
The order which he imposes is not, therefore, a juridical order.
In the theory of natural law, on the
other hand, man with all his rights is
social. And we must consider the complete nature of man as a member of a
social community with a task to perform,
not merely as he is known by social
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psychology as an intelligent being who
has interests he wishes to satisfy.
Finality, as understood by natural law, is
imposed by the very nature of man as a
social being who must by nature seek
the common good. This finality is itself
juridical and not merely ethical in the
modern sense of individual ethics, and it
creates law by itself prior to and independently of positive legislation.
Some might object that this theorythat a determined finality is the first
principle of the legal order-creates law,
and favors dictatorship in the formation
of law, as for example Nazism. With
Pound's theory, they would add, this
danger is absent because there is no predetermined finality but only juridical
politics in a determined society.
To this objection we reply that it is
clear that juridical finality could be
abused and made to serve the end of
totalitarianism. To avoid this danger we
must create barriers and also have recourse to a certain individualism. This
individualist principle of order is found
in natural law and as a juridical principle.
Natural law does not say that any finality
is juridical. If that were the case, then
it would be true that the objectives proposed for itself by any determined political
regime would have the power to create
law. But only that finality which corresponds to human nature has the power
to create law. Therefore the principle
cannot serve the ends of any form of
totalitarianism. On the contrary, it. is
the surest protection against absolutism
since it insists that finality as found in
human nature not only creates law but
also renders morally and juridically void
any positive legislation contrary to that

finality. In Pound's theory, on the other
hand, this protection is absent because
there are no rights in the person but only
interests which are recognized by political
authority.
It follows, if there are no
higher norms, that the authority which
granted recognition to certain interests
could likewise withdraw that recognition.
With our conception of finality we can
resolve questions of law where there is
no positive determination. For Pound,
on the other hand, these questions can
only be resolved by a compromise of conflicting interests. If understood properly
his principle is not entirely false because
interests, in so far as they are conformed
to human nature, are a principle of order.
But experience demonstrates that not
every interest which men seek to secure
is conformed to human nature. Because
interests which are in conformity with
human nature are a principle of order,
Christian theory of natural law has
always supported the principle of subsidiarity as a juridical principle. According to this principle, individuals seek to
satisfy their own interests in an order
which is conformed to nature and which
seeks first the common good. This cannot be identified with Pound's theory of
interests, which are not and cannot be
juridical principles.
Norms: The most important part of
Pound's philosophy of law gives occasion
to a discussion of his conception of norms.
Actually he has no juridical norms in the
strict sense. What he admits as similar
to norms are the interests of the citizens
organized in a political society. Peace
and order are to be realized in this society, not according to any superior
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norms, but only according to the different
wills.
To be sure, there is some rule, some
norm, i.e., freedom. But this freedom has
no determined content. The content, the
manner, of this freedom is in continuous
evolution, depending on the decision of
the citizen. The concept of freedom as a
rule is, therefore, similar to a categorical
concept of Kant, without any determination. Nevertheless we have to recognize that Pound, by underlining individual
freedom, is in no way in agreement with
the neo-Kantian, Kelsen, for whom there
is nothing determined by the concept of
law. For Kelsen, Russian law would be
law in the same way as American law.
Pound's doctrine of freedom, on the contrary, determines the concept of law in a
restricted sense, though he does not admit
any determination for this freedom.
Here the doctrine of natural law proceeds by determining the freedom of man
according to a really strict norm, that of
human nature. And in this manner we
come to an ethical concept of norms,
that is, a norm imposed as an ideal for
everyone. For human nature is not only
a norm for the individual man; it is the
same for all of humanity. Thus human
nature becomes a principle for organizing
every human society.
But this doctrine of natural law as an
ethical norm of society provokes a delicate
question, i.e., whether this norm must be
rigorously and rigidly applied to society.
The difficulty is evident. When we have
to apply ethical norms to society in the
same way as to the individual man, there
is no more freedom for each man in the
sense that his own discretion and
arbitrariness be the norm of social organ-
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ization and social engineering. There, only
the objective truth, which is imposed on
everybody, is a norm. Here, one could
speak of a dogmatic function of law,
settled by an authority like divine
authority. But where is this infallible
authority?
Contemporary society no
longer acknowledges such an authority as
it was in medieval times when Christian
faith was the foundation of all social
action. Modem society has no common
conscience. On the contrary, human conscience has disintegrated to the point
where there are as many consciences as
there are human beings.
For this reason we are forced to regulate social order according to the principle of individual freedom. Otherwise
there would be no order. Or should we.,
perhaps, regulate it according to authoritarianism? This is excluded by reason
of the fact that no human authority can
guarantee to conduct human society in a
really objective sense. Therefore authoritarianism must always remain a social or
political system opposed to ethical norms.
We come, apparently, to the same conclusion proposed by Pound: individual
freedom is the rule for social engineering.
That much is certainly true. But there
is a great difference. Our conclusion is
really a conclusion, that is an application
of ethical principles. According to our
principle there is not simply individual
freedom but freedom absolutely subjected
to objective truth. Only in the application can we agree that individual freedom
can be recognized as a rule of order. 50
And even in this we can never abandon
150 Cf. UTz, RECHT UND GERECHLIGKEIT 564-71

(1953).
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the ethical demand that the juridical
order, in so far as it is possible, must constantly seek the absolute truth. According to the doctrine of natural law, there
exists in every man a certain general
knowledge of ethical demands. It is for
this reason, for example, that after
World War II it was possible to punish
war criminals.
It appears that Pound supposes this
general knowledge of ethical demands in
saying that apart from freedom there is
another norm, i.e., "civilization." However, it is not clear what he means by
this term. Like freedom, this concept of
civilizaton is, with Pound, evolutionary
and devoid of any determined content.
Nevertheless, this conception seems to
approach the above mentioned idea of a
general knowledge of ethical demands.
However, this is an interpretation which
may not have been Pound's when he
speaks of civilization. Because the term
as used by him is vague and used to denominate a future possible, it cannot
serve as a juridical norm. To summarize,
Pound attempts to build a juridical system without any juridical norms.
Conclusion
We have seen briefly, but in its essential
elements, the legal philosophy of Roscoe
Pound. For him, law is a process of
social engineering, a process of adjusting
and compromising conflicting claims so
that the maximum of human interest may
be satisfied with a minimum of friction
and waste. The philosophical foundations
of Pound's legal theory is essentially
pragmatism; law is defined in terms of
function.
Natural law and philosophy
are admitted as supplying ideal norms
which may be used as a critique of

existing law or to formulate positive
laws, but they are not admitted as juridical norms. Natural law, in the Thomistic
sense, is rejected chiefly because it is not
known. When Pound speaks of natural
law he is referring to later concepts of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Pound's legal theory is radically deficient because he attempts to create a
legal order without juridical norms.
Although he speaks frequently of absolute
norms of justice, in reality he does not
admit of such norms or he confuses them
with social or cultural norms. As is
evident from his use of the jural postulates, the law should be designed to meet
the reasonable expectations of the society
of the time and place. The law then is,
for him, an instrument for ordering social
life in a determinate society, something
which is wholly foreign to the absolute
norms of natural law of which St. Thomas
speaks. Pound speaks of morality in the
law, but on these principles it could be
only a morality born of the social conscience of the time and place. A Thomist could not admit such a norm of
morality. For a Thomist human nature
is the principle not only of individual
ethics but also of social ethics, of which
legal philosophy forms a part. The legal
order must, therefore, enforce a moral
conduct which is objective and not born
of a particular social or cultural conscience.
In practice, however, it is extremely
difficult to change an established legal
system and theory. If the norm for
jurisprudence is to be the individual will,
then the task that faces the scholastic
legal scholar is one of juridical politics.
The individual conscience must be so
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formed that what each one wills corresponds with what he should will. The
principle that the individual will provides the ultimate norm for a legal system can provide the basis for a stable
social and legal order only when the individual will is perfectly subjected to the
objective norms deriving from human nature. Admittedly it would be difficult to
the point of impossibility to form the
conscience of all so that they corresponded
exactly with objective norms of human
action. But if a majority, or even a
large number, of the citizens were so
formed then their desires would be reflected in laws more in conformity with
the demands of natural law.
In the practical order, one of Pound's
constant concerns has been to avoid any
form of absolutism in government. To
this end he insists that we must have
absolute norms of values. If the ideals
are absolute, he says, it puts something
above the ruler or ruling body, something
by which to judge them and by which
they are held to rule. Yet it is impossible
for Pound himself to have absolute
ideals of justice. Based as it is on a
theory of social interests, his measure of
values must necessarily be relative and
also must necessarily be constantly
changing and adjusting to the needs of
the time and place. Further, since this
theory of interest admits of no absolute
rights but only interests that have been
recognized by the political force of the
society, it follows that the political force
that granted the recognition can likewise withdraw its recognition. Thus the
individual is left without any rights that
owe their existence to his nature. The
interests of the individual are enforceable
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only if and to the extent that they are
recognized by the political force of the society. It is evident, therefore, that the
very thing that Pound is most anxious to
avoid is rendered more easily possible and
the door is left open to absolutism in
government. Only when there is recognition of rights based on human nature is
freedom guaranteed.
Besides the juridical politics mentioned
above there is yet another way that
scholastic philosophers and legal scholars
can exercise an influence in the accepted
schools of jurisprudence. It has been
seen that Pound draws his materials from
the most diverse sources. Although this
does not alter his fundamental pragmatism, it does offer an opportunity to
modem scholastics to exercise an influence even within the framework of
pragmatic legal theory. At the present
time there is in America a decided dissatisfaction with the reigning legal theory.
Jurists, and Pound among the first, are
calling for legal philosophy to direct the
new movement. In the past jurists have
rejected natural-law theories because they
have been confronted with pseudo
theories. The task for scholastics is to
present the authentic natural law and
allow it to be judged on its own merits.
Another strong movement which can
be noticed among American jurists is a
sentiment for codification of the law.
If such a move should come, it would
not necessarily destroy the commonlaw technique, but it would give
a greater stability to the law. Modern
scholastics must be prepared to present
the traditional Thomistic doctrine of law.
The time is ripe and the sentiment is
well disposed for it to be received into
the law.

